

Oct 20

- Oct 27 Transcript:

no suspicion that VZ was
not authorized, or that AA
was independent.

- JFK wants to trade: asks only,
immediate balt to construction
while negot.

(But RFK asks dispute start -
no public trade -

~~therefore~~ JFK did not want to
reject trade Oct 27

- because he wanted to appeal
to accept it (of Oct 28)

- because he thought rejection
would be discovered if known
publicly

(K could have made RFK's
rejection public; and/or made public
his "promise" of trade in case of
Turkish missiles "if" (crisis settled;
no public mention]

[to our transcript;
compare to Nitz
compare to Edie. Summary
(consult Kaplan?
Met Hober?)

Full? ~~OK~~

1. RFK warning: 3 elements
told to me '64

2.

to one hundred

of the

of the

of the

of the

of the

of the

of the

of the

It seems that Pius did not share
his colleagues / determination to trade
— rather than strike — on Oct 28, with
McN, or Ball — or they wouldn't have
been so worried, Sat evening / Sun morning.

Did he with McG B? ("Not confirmed"
by Pius now.)

With RFK?!

(Was this why he moved with RFK
on hearing of the war? rather than
tell him?

Was McN urged / expected to
read RFK memoirs, because of
48-hour warnings — or because of secret
Tummy deal? Which "went beyond
his instructions?"

Ask McG B

Oct 20
87

Who wrote True Essay - 1982?

(ask Talbott?)

Why didn't they tell the truth then?

(Because they had all
designed with JFK? or had they
only?

Couldn't admit about lost?

JFK willing to lose?

DO WE HAVE TO WAIT 25 YEARS FOR N/HAR NAT SEC TAPES?

Why did McG admit now? in. trans. in

Why did McG volunteer for my trial?

~~Why~~ (Note: He was right in '65, *


But let him be over-ruled!

and why was he so wrong in File '65?

Why did he lie to Morton Mintz about
delegation?

What will his book say?

How Dans he admit our threats in 61, 62
now? (Betts)



20 Oct 87

1 JPR seems to have been determined not to invade Cuba —

or "en" to strike missiles (or SAMs?)


[Was McN dissembling in Oct 27 transcript?]

Would he admit it now — as
in case of "value of our sup,"
"FC threats" ?]

2 just as he was "determined" (REF^{to me, 1967}) not
to fight blockade on ground, like French
— i.e. invade SVN (or NVN) :

3. But in both cases he had to hide this
in govt, as well as to US public
(and to "enemy" and to allies)

4. He was bad to admit steps — to
hide his true aims (moves to Europe, achieving
to VN, blockade) that prompted stalemate + RISKS
(Dein corp; public statements) OF ESCALATION
SECRECY ON HIS DISAGREE-
and to "demonstrate" false . missives (bluff)



MENTS WITH ADVISORS AND FAILURE TO ACCEPT
THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS


[SEE by discovery about JFK vs.
Taylor / Rostow in 1961 over TROOPS AND
as in 1962! BOMBING!

AND LIES ABOUT THIS ("Q.M.")
AS LATE AS JUNE '71 (Taylor!)
(citing "misinterpretation",
misphrases, lies to Pres (military
responsibility, the misphrases,"
i.e. just Lyndon's (Stimulus?)
"cognitive process" model -

us. under Pres politics, cowardice,
risk-taking, fear of humiliation, obedience,
lies/secrecy...

not "sleep-walking" - though,
as if sleep-walking - but with
eyes open

("as if hypnotized" - see
Found an obsession, group, business
(transfer to leader of faith (mother?)
loyalty.



The uses of his policy⁺ were greater than
he realized on Saturday, Oct 27, 1962 —
things he won, without see —

but were realized in 1964-75 in VN,
after he died (and plans would have
been based on his mind 1)


(Hilman?) see Whiting on his plans w/ot Mind
(+ see RFR to me, '67 — on 63-64)

+ see JFR/Mansfield (O'Donnell) in 62 (63?)
on waiting till ^{after} '64 ...

as, in '62, ... fear of election...

AND SEE ARMS RACE: presumption
of MCN (+ VFR? McGB) that it
was unnecessary (dangerous)

→ The System was dangerous, made: yet it had promoted them,
it was exciting, and they were "running" it — and right
[Best + Brightest people themselves on the front-
inner, private (childish, blind about, closely)
dovishness, wisdom; and the saw "mad"
quality of JCS (see letters, RFR — "I had had
us've got MCN) Congress, public; here, have been
the way there; but "misread" nothing done with
they were doing to maintain System, TAKE RISKS: DENIAL



Oct 27 transcript

Hyp: JFK origin was not at failure to
remove minutes before Oct 15,
but at resistance to travel Oct 15-27,
esp. 21-27


Co/ failure to talk to Turks directly,
22-27 Oct!

(lies about this ^{subversion} since 1962 on part
of his about JFK consequently denies to
travel, not moving to "have minutes off
the board" so we could strike, with
reduced risk of retal. vs. Turkey."

This was McN's position, not JFK's!

Hyp: JFK was glad to have minutes in
Turkey to travel — rather than to have to
travel Berlin!

[Hyp on lat night: JFK picks up McN's
teacher, tells them to Dobrynin, in hopes of getting
a deal (^{small} clandestine, + strike)
BURLATOKY says Turkish trade was part of war —



Can Debing afford to prepare for a
public Trade — did R hope this would be
results? But ^{the} not press on Sunday?
e.g. give letter/side margin on Sunday?
Costs AA!

A same approach won (beyond bank drama,
wrt SU, not idea)

but for reasons they didn't foresee,
at high risk " " "
so banks don't look good;

("But the down on Real! see!")


(like Bulls in early 1987).

(^{was won} still bulls in Oct)

things Dons ^(also!) were wrong to believe ~~the~~
(like Banks!) that that couldn't win.

JFR strategy would not have been risky
if he had definitely (as is his on mind?)
divided on no more on Sunday (he didn't)
OR could he center he would not retal. to
another

[SEE HIS INTENT ON UN! RFR
TO ME, 67]



Oct 20-87

VFR strategy — vs. Skenson — was
to be toys, initially — at time of
(“on s'engage, puis on voit”)
announcing the situation

(i.e. that he had earlier been
wrong, “exclusionary / trusting of doers” (!)
inattention, ... compared to Ruffalo
challenges...)

^{withheld,}
(see Sec. Davis of France
in announcing Kilger troops had left
Chad, with the hitch;
Chad, “discovering” Samir Cullen
bujoir (^{pre-1979} selective year; killing SACT-II)
Carter, a affghan

(claimed, disastrous, to have been
surprised, embarrassed, shocked [WHY?]
and died little

just after hostages taken by him!

[Fake “crises”]

[motivation to eat ECR]

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But linked together & "crises"
minimal commitment
and risks


and JFK hoped risks would have
included NATO/Judgy ^{+ public} to accept (Stevenson)
trade — but was he right? Prob. not.
Ad backdown would have been worse
of Oct 28 than a Oct 21-22 (Stevenson).

WATCH ESCALATION IN PERSIAN GULF —

FROM HERE ON! (First US attack

yesterday, 19 Oct 87)

(with passive, paralyzed fascination —
like a snake's ~~dark~~ prey?)



CMC

20 Oct 87

JFK?

Good news

But

Bad News

- 1.) Was wise in evaluating
- "fairness" of trade
 - "in eyes of world" (?)

- risk of loss of control
- dangers in escalation
- prob. of escalation
- risk of war
- honor of war
- honor of invasion
- willingness to accept

SC as "equal"

(despite lack of
manned parity)

- venturing about U-2
"shootdown"

- appra. of allies' tendencies

3) Spurred his will,

cautiously, in certain respects:

- no ujat news
- no immediate retal for

U-2

BUT

2) gradualists initially:

- rules not "acceptance"
- domestic political rules
- creation of "crises"

(Cubanitas warnings;

bluff - K's assurance?

suber-surrey

- consider of air-strike

- blockade

- ignored Castro motives,

- ignored (?) Mayaguez in
interfering SC motives

- saw U-2/AA as K move

- RFK "ignores ult" &
news; 48-hr bluff.

4. BUT accepted "consensus"

for Saturday : no trade.

~~despite~~ (despite ①)

[How much did JFK fear

leak/denunciation from within
E/plan/VCS?

BUT

5. Advisors' judgments

(except: Ball

CBJ!

McLone?

6. Advisors'/minorists

LIES on mind

(is it childish,

is fear of ^{McG B's} revelation of

JFK's wisdom, to explain

of advisors' foolishness,

the influence / JFK capture,

and this (McGB) sway

& his for 25 years?!

and the revels they took,

unwittingly but (is

lack of JFK/McN will

fear and control of loss of
control) foolishly?

7. die (of Pres, too) about

Stevenson (being "alone -

as "oppression" - things he didn't
want to be "tough front, then compromise"

